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This article questions how we might continue to envision an open and inviting engagement between 
the terrains of childhood studies and queer theory. Matters of childhood innocence in particular are 
problematised throughout. The paper builds on the offerings of queer of colour scholarship and 
women of colour feminism, endeavouring to contribute to an emergent childhood studies that is 
informed by queer and feminist understandings that uphold the materiality and lived experience of 
the child, both in theory and in practice.  
 
Key words 
Queer theory, Feminism, Childhood, Black Feminist thought, Materiality, Queer of colour critique 
 
Introduction: placing the queer child on the map 
 
Aligning childhood studies and queer theory as symbiotic interlocutors may at first appear a 
treacherous task: talking of queerness does not easily conjure the child and talking of children does 
not easily conjure the queer1. In the words of Michael Cobb, though, ‘interest in queer children has 
been around since queer theory’s own fraught childhood’ (2005: 125), and the bridge-building 
exercise between these disciplines is thus not a new endeavour. Yet at present, the dialogue between 
queer theory and childhood is taciturn; queer theory, in spite of its subversive and disruptive 
prowess, oftentimes appears inattentive to the materiality of the child: it slips through our scholarly 
cracks. But, like a disgruntled child, materiality demands attention. This paper tends to and 
synthesises existing discussions on the matter of materiality, remembering and revisiting the 
possibilities of prior contributions to childhood studies that take the child’s materiality seriously. 
 
We are witnessing, in our current sociopolitical moment, a plethora of discursive constructions of 
the queer child. The transgender child in particular has taken a distinct precedence, emerging as a 
site not only of theoretical contemplation but also as a locus from which moral panic and 
transphobia, disguised as child protection and safeguarding, emanates (for instance, Brunskell-
Evans and Moore 2018); where queerness and childhoods merge, the echoes of hostility and 
indignation ring loud. We are also witnessing a resurgent global civil rights movement with the 
perennial assertion Black Lives Matter at its core. Without exploiting the mo(ve)ment for scholarly 
prowess, the demand for protection, preservation, and sustenance of Black life and Black childhood 
proves critical. Worlds are being stitched together before us, and in the face of this it must be 
reasserted that (queer) children are more than a theoretical challenge (cf. Kennedy and Hellen 
2010). This paper thus envisions a generous encounter (cf. Ahmed 2000) at the interstices of queer 
 
1 A note on my use of queer: in the context of this paper, ‘queer’ is used as an expansive and encompassing term. 
‘Queer’ is deployed as both noun and verb. Queer as noun refers to identities that are beyond the bounds of normative 
(cisgender, heterosexual) notions of gender and sexuality, whilst queer as verb (queering/queered) refers to the 
processes and consequences of usurping normativity, subverting and making ‘strange’.  
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theory, queer of colour critique2 (hereafter QOC critique), women of colour feminism3, and 
childhood studies, in order to affirm and effect arguments that encourage the (re)centring of the 
material child.  
 
Throughout, I think alongside existing scholarship in this journal and elsewhere with regards to the 
necessity of problematising innocence as both moral rhetoric and as a mechanism of white 
supremacy, whilst also contributing to continuing debates regarding the linearity of child 
development. The paper begins with a contemplation of the mechanics of innocence as applied to 
queer childhoods in particular, wherein the temporal incompatibilities of childhood and queerness 
are called into question. I then discuss the ways in which innocence has been bound to the fiction of 
race, considering the nuances of queer temporality and the way temporal logics become implicated 
in violent regimes that culminate in children’s premature death. The final section seeks to contribute 
to the small but vital body of scholarship advocating for continuing disciplinary alliances and 
coalitional thinking between women of colour feminism, queer theory, and childhood studies, and 
argues that such coalitions must be brought to the fore of our theoretical imaginations. In lending 
our attention to normativity and innocence such notions may be queered from the inside out, their 
credence resisted and their rhetorics denaturalised, and success in this endeavour should keep the 
integrity and agency of the material child intact. 
 
Innocent becomings: the temporalities of childhood and the futurity of “queer” 
 
What a child “is”, is a darkening question (Stockton 2009: 2), and what a child should be, is even 
more so. This question of childhood ontology serves as my primary point of departure, and I begin 
with a discussion of the traction that has been afforded to childhood development and the restrictive 
linearity it bolsters. Children and their growth, their emergence, their becoming, have long been 
known in accordance with discourses of development. Reflecting on sociological childhood studies, 
Moran-Ellis illustrates the ways in which children often become visible ‘only in respect of their 
progress along the path to adulthood’ (2010: 187). This path to adulthood is of course the path well-
trodden. The child can be figured as walking along this path, compass in hand, being oriented and 
learning to orient themselves in adherence to a trajectory of normative development that culminates 
in the child becoming the right kind of adult. The child may well walk of its own volition, but the 
direction of its travels is preordained. 
 
In light of this, we may consider Castañeda’s polemic attention to the mutable potentiality of the 
child (cf. Burman and Stacey 2010: 231).  Castañeda is rightly critical of the notion that ‘the child is 
not only in the making but is also malleable—and so can be made’ (2002: 2-3). Indeed, childhood 
appears akin to clay on a potter’s wheel, ready to be coaxed upwards, shaped and contained. But 
 
2 Drawing on Ferguson (2005), Tomás Boatwright defines QOC critique as that which ‘seeks to illuminate the unique 
lived experiences of queer people of color and their communities by putting them at the centre of exploration’ (2016: 
74-75). 
3 When speaking of women of colour feminism, I am referring to an analytic paradigm conjured by women of colour 
that is primarily concerned with co-constitutive critiques of institutionalised racism, sexism, heteronormativity and 
homophobia. Women of colour feminism also advocates for close attention to lived experience and embodiment. This 
work is particularly indebted to the offerings of Gloria Anzaldúa, Cherrie Moraga, bell hooks, Audre Lorde, and 
Patricia Hill Collins, for instance. 
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both the clay and the child have minds of their own—agentic in their resistance to haptic pressure 
from too-heavy-hands, or to corralling by the logics of normativity—spilling out, twisting sideways. 
The child is not freely malleable. Overworked clay becomes brittle, and it breaks. The same 
happens to the (queer) child forced to become in line with heteronormative trajectories: the queer 
child cracks.   
 
Whilst childhood may emerge as a ‘temporality of anticipation’ (Thomson and Baraitser 2018: 68), 
a waiting period oriented to a chrononormative future, there is always the possibility that the fruits 
of our labour of patience may turn out wonky. Does the queer child inhabit a wonky body-mind, 
does the wonky child embody a state of queer? It is to these queer inhabitancies and alternate modes 
of being and becoming that queer theoretical approaches working alongside childhood studies have 
turned. The temporal positioning of queerness is complex; perhaps queerness is reductively 
understood as ‘phase’, revoking the (sexual) agency of the child and straightening the child out. Or 
perhaps queerness is recognised as something that can be, just not now. Martin’s (2009) study of 
mothers’ assumptions of heterosexuality and inscriptions of heteronormativity illuminate the ways 
in which queerness is future oriented, kept out of reach of the child. One mother responds, ‘I want 
[my daughter] to know that it would be ok whatever she grew up to be’ (2009: 202, emphasis 
added).  Whether positioned as something to grow out of or something to grow into, queerness for 
the child-at-present is intangible. In Stockton’s terms, the gay child is a ghostly child ‘because it 
could not live in the present tense’ (2016: 507). The queer child is an apparition, selectively seen 
and existing on a temporal plane that is at once shaped by and at odds with teleological 
development; ‘the queer child haunts normative descriptions and temporal positionings of what it 
means to grow up’, and these normative and developmental temporalities can ‘make queerness 
intolerable’ (Dyer 2020: 15, 26). Queerness, granted only in retrospect, resides outside of the 
domain of childhood, and is marked as the antithesis of the child.  
 
Some of the most pertinent denials of childhood queerness in our current moment can be located in 
debates concerning the transgender child4. Heather Brunskell-Evans and Michele Moore’s edited 
text Transgender Children and Young People: Born in Your own Body (2018), is a particularly 
illustrative example of this. The writings are rife with rhetoric wherein transness is denigrated (as 
fabrication, doctrine, ideology) and children’s agency and self-knowledge are undermined, offering 
a fruitful insight into contemporary imaginings that place transgender childhood at their core. 
Borrowing from Gill-Peterson, this collection of essays might be recognised as ‘a libel placed on 
the very existence of trans children, a vicious question mark shaped around being’ (2018: vii), 
operating under the guise of rational debate. A chapter co-authored by both editors lays out the 
book’s arguments as being ‘written against the grain of this thinking and practice, and challeng[ing] 
transgender ideology’. They state, ‘as Editors, our central contention is that transgender children 
don’t exist’ (Brunskell-Evans and Moore 2018: 1). For these writers, the ‘transgender child’ is a 
risky figure, used to justify a project that is ‘politically reactionary, medically dangerous and 
 
4 I want to thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out that there are a multitude of trans critiques of queer theory 
(see Benavente and Gill-Peterson 2019), and that queer theoretical invocations of temporality are not necessarily 
generated out of concern for the transgender child. It is not my intension to argue that the trans child and queer theory 
are collapsible, but I do argue that the figure and materiality of the transgender child in this context proves illustrative 
for exposing the labyrinthine bind of queerness, temporality and innocence. 
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abusive of children’ (2018: 3). In this imagination, to deny the corporeal experiences of trans 
childhood is to protect the real child who is marked as innocent and passive, vulnerable to 
corruption and medically legitimated harm. Robin Bernstein asks the ever-burning question in her 
foundational text Racial Innocence, ‘how did childhood acquire so much affective weight that the 
exhortation to “protect the children” seems to add persuasive power to almost any argument?’ 
(2011: 2), and indeed we must consider how these calls to preserve the sanctity of normative and 
innocent childhood function as transphobia in (weak) disguise. Narratives such as Brunskell-Evans 
and Moore’s are not new; the incongruence between childhood and queerness has long been 
problematic, arising from discursive constructions that naturalise the child as innocent and proto-
cisheterosexual. In theory and in practice, there remains a fundamental negation of the fact that 
children are competent knowers of their own lives, identities, bodies, and minds, and the ‘sanctified 
image of a phantom child’ (Pugh 2011: 162), always innocent and in danger of corruption, takes 
precedence over the lived experiences of real children, some of whom are already queer. 
 
So what becomes of the bona fide queer child? For Dyer, queer childhood is conceived as that 
which ‘exceeds the confines of normalcy and resists normative assessments in growth’ (2014: ii). 
The value of queer theoretical scholarship thus resides in its generative capabilities; the queer child 
is coaxed out, no longer consigned to speculative shadows—queer theory makes space for the child 
to grow sideways (Stockton 2009), usurping the temporal and developmental norm. Facilitating 
sideways growth means recognising the child as a knowing agent in their own right—it means 
sustaining the life and queerness of the corporeal child. It makes sense, then, that scholars working 
to cultivate worlds where queer children have liveable lives in the present would seek to espouse the 
tangibility of children’s queerness, whether by claiming as Stockton (2009, 2016) does that 
childhood is a queer affect in itself, or by celebrating the ‘outness’ of real queer children and taking 
their refusals of shame and shadows as evidence of the vibrant possibilities that may be afforded to 
young queer life. Nevertheless, such cultivation is not in-and-of-itself straightforward, and it 
becomes necessary to interrogate the ways in which coaxing the queer child out of speculative 
shadows may too become problematic.  
 
The whiteness of queer theory when applied to childhood results in a tendency to valorise the 
visibly queer child—why do we demand the queer child must be seen? Given the effacing nature of 
homophobic and transphobic rhetoric that places queerness and childhoods in opposition, this is a 
seemingly natural response—celebrating the existence of the ‘out’ queer child in a challenge to 
developmental normativity and discourses that demand queers remain ‘closeted’ until the 
temporalities of innocence and childhood are outgrown. But for QOC critic Ed Brockenbrough 
(2015), the reliance on whiteness in queer theory texts casts coming out as a liberatory act, 
reflecting a white middle-class epistemological bias that does not necessarily resonate for queer 
people of colour. This tentative critique of queer visibility may appear at odds with broader activism 
and scholarship that values and affirms the visibility of queer, but what makes a QOC critique so 
useful here is that it situates the ambivalence towards coming out in the racially and culturally 
mediated lived experiences of queers of colour, demanding due attention to the politics of outness. 
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Brockenbrough’s considerations occur primarily in the context of queer youth, but an extrapolation 
to childhood more specifically is possible. The child is typically regarded as public property (of 
parents, the court, the state), and the child’s right to privacy is contested. Brockenbrough’s 
invocation to decentre whiteness and visibility allows for the possibility of the private child, and for 
the child’s right to private personhood to be fulfilled. The nuance afforded to the tensions of queer 
visibility is thus fruitful and must be incorporated into our scholarly imagination. Taking heed of 
Brockenbrough’s considerations of the racialised dynamics of outness and visibility, the queer 
childhood studies I am envisioning must conjure alternative ways of valorising queer lives as lived 
and queerness as embodied by children and young people. These must not be reliant on abstract 
theorising that neglects the corporeality of queerness and shies away from the possibility of actually 
queer children, nor should they be rooted in theoretical and empirical calls for ubiquitous queer 
visibility without consideration of the multiply mediated matrices of identity and self-knowledge 
that children negotiate. If we are to allow queer theory and childhood studies to ‘thicken together’ 
(Dyer 2020: 5), we must facilitate a wider cognisance of the implications of our theorising on a 
corporeal level; it is a matter of suturing the disjuncture between theory and flesh, and dismantling 
innocence’s hold on queerness without reifying and reproducing queer theory’s notorious 
conceptual whiteness.   
 
Queer undoings: the whiteness of childhood innocence 
 
Whilst queer theory’s untethering of childhood from the bind of innocence has largely been situated 
in the domain of sexuality, the same theoretical grounding has been used to interrogate the concept 
in other sites too; a queer theoretical approach to childhood grounded in materiality must be taken 
beyond sex and sexual agency. Prior scholarship has laid foundational ground in this endeavour, but 
the nuances of innocence continue to demand attention. As Johnson proffers, ‘most current 
formulations of queer theory either ignore the categories of race and class altogether, or theorise 
their effects in discursive rather than material terms’ (2001: 1). Indeed, ‘the distinction between “the 
child” as a figure and “children” as actual biological bodies produces an ineffable gap in knowledge 
about race and sex, rather than extinguishing it’ (Gill-Peterson 2018: 57).   
 
The spectre of the innocent and pure Apollonian child5 is not only ‘instrumentalised in regulatory 
surveillance of sexual practice’, but also deployed in line with ‘racialised accounts of what it means 
to be human’ (Dyer 2014: 28). There is a harrowing discrepancy in the way innocence is afforded 
and denied in our imaginations and the figure of the child that this conjures. As Stockton asserts, 
‘children, as an idea, are likely to be both white and middle-class. It is a privilege to need to be 
protected—and to be sheltered—and thus to have a childhood’ (2009: 31). Whiteness and middle-
classness have long been signifiers of the archetype of humanity, and Stockton’s elocution 
illustrates how childhood is not exempt from this systemic inequity. Childhood has long been 
operant in discourses of what it means to be human (Dyer 2014), and these discourses are bound 
with historical and contemporary processes of racialisation. As Bernstein notes, 
 
5 The Apollonian child is described by Jenks as ‘angelic, innocent and untainted by the world which they have recently 
entered. They have a natural goodness and a clarity of vision that we might ‘idolise’ or even ‘worship’ as the source of 
all that is best in human nature’ (2002: 73).  
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by the mid-nineteenth century, sentimental culture had woven childhood and innocence 
together wholly. Childhood was then understood not as innocent but as innocence itself; not 
as a symbol of innocence but as its embodiment (2011: 4).  
 
Bernstein offers a deep historical interrogation of the uneven attribution of childhood innocence, 
and she draws on mid-late nineteenth century conceptions of white children as ‘tender angels’, and 
Black children as ‘unfeeling, noninnocent, nonchildren’ to do so (2011: 33). The conflation of 
normativity and innocence as operant under discourses of white supremacist heteropatriarchy 
(hooks 1994) denies the shelter of innocence to the Black/brown/indigenous/migrant/disabled/queer 
child who is, by proxy, marked as risky. The terrain of childhood innocence is jagged and disparate, 
and to uncritically talk of innocence negates the structural and ideological matrices that render the 
risky child ‘suspect’. Stacey Patton (2014), in an article for the Washington Post, attends to the 
denial of innocence to Black children in particular: ‘Black children are considered innately inferior, 
dangerous, and indistinguishable from Black adulthood. Black children are not afforded the same 
presumption of innocence as white children, especially in life-or-death situations’. The work of 
Leila Kamali echoes Patton’s evocations and Bernstein’s critical interrogation of Black children as 
‘nonchildren’. Kamali refers to the case of Emmett Till, a 14-year-old Black boy who was brutally 
murdered in 1955 by white perpetrators, to illustrate the racialised mechanics of ‘adultification’, a 
process which denies differentiation between adult and child. She writes, ‘when the black child is 
“adultified”—imagined to be a black adult—the category of childhood is instantly decimated by the 
fiction of race’ (2012: 34). The legal principle of innocent until proven guilty may well be 
sacrosanct for the white child, but for the Black child, it is often the inverse that rings true6. Cited in 
an article for Look Magazine (1956), Till’s great-uncle testified: “he looked like a man” (Kamali 
2012: 35; Huie 1956); ‘the process of adultification justifies harsher, more punitive responses to 
rule-breaking behaviour’ (Kamali 2012: 34), and a boy’s ‘mannishness’ works to justify his death.  
 
If queerness warps the temporalities of childhood, so too does Blackness. Kamali considers this in 
her engagement with well-worn childhood studies debates surrounding the notion of ‘being versus 
becoming’, and this discussion is necessary given the lack of consideration of being and becoming’s 
queer and racialised dynamics. In Kamali’s view, the process of ‘adultification’, as rooted in the 
temporalities of childhood and bound to the fiction of race, has the capacity to ‘obliterate the 
process of “becoming” to the point that the “being” child—that child who has agency in the social 
world—is indistinguishable from the adult’ (2012: 41). Under the guise of innocence, if the queer 
child is a perpetual ‘becoming’, the Black child is always a ‘being’, residing within an accelerated 
temporality, denied the transitional status of ‘child’. This conception rightfully problematises and 
complicates the current state of childhood studies thinking with regards to beings and becomings, 
but nonetheless elisions remain. If the queer child is always becoming, and the Black child is 
always a being, what do we make of the queer Black child who further complicates the bounds of 
being and becoming, in that they embody at once both and neither? This question is one I do not 
have immediate answers to, but it is clear that debates around ‘being’ versus ‘becoming’ have 
implications not only for children as agentic social actors, but also for children’s capacities to live a 
 
6 See, for instance, Meiner (2016) for an extended discussion on carcerality and childhood innocence. 
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liveable life, and it is to questions like this that we must turn our attention if the embodied 
experiences of children are to be cared for in full.  
 
Hannah Dyer’s The Queer Aesthetics of Childhood (2020) discusses the violence of adultification 
with attention to the murder of 12-year-old Tamir Rice, a Black child, shot and killed when his toy 
gun was mistaken for a real one. The comments made by Steve Loomis, president of the Cleveland 
Police Patrolman’s Association, echo the testimony of Till’s uncle and again the Black child is 
propelled at speed beyond the protective parameters of childhood: Rice was ‘menacing…He wasn’t 
that little kid you’re seeing in pictures. He’s a 12-year-old in an adult body’ (Schultz 2015). Dyer’s 
consideration of Tamir Rice occurs primarily in the context of an artistic installation by Ebony G. 
Patterson, entitled … when they grow up …. The installation, Dyer describes, ‘criticised the killing 
of Rice and other children whose racialisation fatally forecloses assumptions of their innocence’ 
(2020: 34-35). In her work, Patterson curates a space where audiences are encouraged to mourn for 
these children whilst also witnessing a world in which their innocence is taken seriously and their 
deaths are not inevitable. Calls to dismantle innocence as a naturalised condition of childhood by 
those theorising children’s agency and knowingness are necessary, particularly since ‘innocence 
generally holds children captive to the adult’s power’, but for Patterson, ‘innocence is a better 
alternative than death’ (Dyer 2020: 51). The bind of innocence is labyrinthine and the question of 
whether it is something to be expelled or espoused is one without definite answers, but Patterson’s 
installation ‘expresses some of the material struggles children can endure when not consigned to a 
position of inculpability’ (Dyer 2020: 55). Whilst it may appear paradoxical to assert that children 
are vulnerable and innocent after all, until the logics of innocence can be abolished in entirety, 
claiming innocence may actually work to prevent injury and violence: in reclaiming innocence, 
from the grips of whiteness for instance, we may breathe life back into the material child.  
 
Perhaps Black childhood can be recognised as a queer temporality. Queered temporality in 
childhood offers a radical rethinking of normative and appropriate development, but can the 
skewing of time also do harm? Whilst queer time’s refusal to submit to temporal logic is freeing in 
that it makes space for the child to grow sideways (Stockton 2009), queered time may also be 
oppressive, doing violence to the body of the child whose trajectories of development are 
accelerated by the state and its agents, as in the cases of many Black and/or refugee children. 
Refusals of temporal logic are central to adultification; if temporal logics were upheld, perhaps 
these children would be alive today. Dyer explicitly states that her argument is about discouraging 
rhetorics of childhood innocence; ‘I have sought new theories of childhood that redeem the life-
making capacities of children’s development without reinvesting in their innocence’ (2020: 125). 
This is a subtle juncture, but it is where my thinking and Dyer’s, even if only slightly, seem to 
diverge. That is, I want to suggest that there is value in reclaiming innocence, at least until 
innocence can be recomposed for all. Whilst Dyer explicitly discourages a reinvestment in 
innocence, as this section illustrates, some children’s innocence has never been invested in; 
(re)investments in innocence may be necessary in order to be reparative and productive in the long-
term. Until we have successfully cultivated an overarching ethics of care that means we can move 
beyond the parameters of innocence/culpability for all children, some reclamation of innocence 
may be needed to sustain life for those children for whom innocence is denied. I am not claiming 
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that we should rely on innocence or logical and linear temporalities and trajectories of development 
without question nor critique, and I am not claiming that doing so will set us free. Rather, I am 
wondering if we can work concurrently to abolish the logics of childhood innocence and 
development in totality whilst also recognising that for now, if certain children were figured as 
innocent and appropriately grown, their lives may no longer be on the line. We must rescue 
innocence from its complicity in oppressive order and from its preclusions of experience and 
agency, instead making clear its radical potential for making participation and agency of all children 
possible.  
 
Child as theory or child as flesh? Generous encounters with queer theory and women of 
colour feminism 
 
It would be naive to expect queer theory to wholly renounce its conceptualism or theoretical 
prowess but, in this section, I provide a necessary critique of the shortcomings of our current 
coalescence between childhood studies and queer theory. I also offer some antidote to this, 
engaging emerging and continuing dialogues between queer theory, childhood, women of colour 
feminism and QOC critique. This is not pioneering work, and indeed my thinking is here indebted 
to a collective of scholarly ancestors7 (see Stephens 2011; Gill-Peterson, Sheldon and Stockton 
2016, for instance), but such an endeavour remains necessary nonetheless.   
 
The title of this section invokes the work of Chicana feminists Gloria Anzaldúa and Cherríe 
Moraga. Within their co-edited anthology This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women 
of Colour (1983), Moraga coins a ‘theory in the flesh’ as something that validates lived experience, 
offering space for the affective, personal and emotive dimensions of theorising to be upheld. 
Materiality and embodiment take a central position within their work, and are sites of distinct 
precedence within women of colour feminism and QOC critique more broadly. Johnson (2001) 
follows Anzaldúa and Moraga’s notion of ‘theory in the flesh’ and applies it to his framework of 
‘quare studies’. As Henninger notes, ‘quare is a term derived from southern culture…to centre the 
experiences of queer people of colour who have too often been marginalised, if not brutalised, in 
theory and real life alike’ (2018: 6). Thus, if queer theory has been ‘unable to accommodate the 
issues faced by gays and lesbians of color who come from ‘‘raced’’ communities’ (Johnson 2001: 
3), quare studies is a ‘vernacular rearticulation and deployment of queer theory to accommodate 
racialized sexual knowledge’ (2001: 1). This is a necessary intervention given ‘queer theory’s (de 
facto white) discursive project’ (Henninger 2018: 7), and its implications for mergings between 
queer theory and childhood studies too.  
 
To illustrate the dangers of negating materiality and lived experience, we can consider Michael 
Cobb’s suggestion that ‘something about children—less as actual beings and more as what they are 
made to signify—livens up queer theory’ (2005: 120). Whilst this may be partially true, its 
implications are treacherous; his focus on the child-as-signifier denies the body of the child and 
children come to exist as a blank slate, a canvas for investigation and introspection. There is a 
 
7 My thanks are once again extended to the generosity of an anonymous reviewer for directing me further towards this 
body of scholarship. 
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danger in reducing children and their childhoods to mere signifiers, empty vessels from which we 
can take to enhance theoretical thinking. This same problematic emerges in the (vastly critiqued) 
work of Lee Edelman. His polemic text No Future (2004), figures the child as anti-queer—a 
signifier of futurity and reproduction, a tool deployed to perpetuate a heterosexist, misogynistic and 
capitalist social order. ‘Fuck the social order, and the Child in whose name we’re collectively 
terrorised’ (2004: 29), he decries. For Edelman, if this hegemonic, normative social order is to be 
dismantled, ‘the Child as futurity’s emblem must die’ (2004: 30). If the child were only ever a 
phantasmic figuration, these assertions may well ring true, but Edelman is ‘not always skilled at 
differentiating between the symbolic and the actual, or articulating what they might mean for one 
another’ (Minadeo 2019: 5).  
 
The child is not merely a phantasmic figuration, and the dangers of negating the materiality of real 
children hence become clear. As Jose Muñoz contends in his critique of Edelman’s No Future, ‘the 
future is only the stuff of some kids. Racialized kids, queer kids, are not the sovereign princes of 
futurity’ (2009: 95). Not all children are wanted in the future: some of us were never meant to 
survive (Lorde 1997). When Edelman writes of death to the child, for some children this really is 
the case. For these children—racialised and non-normative and queer—there is hope in futurity. 
When Edelman implores us to ‘fuck the future’ because the future is emblematic of trajectories of 
development and chrononormativity and adherence to the right time, he negates the fact that for 
some children, existing in the future is a radical act.  If we decry the future and condemn the figure 
of the child to death, the ghost of the child will haunt us for our failings of its material siblings, 
cousins, and friends. Perhaps it is not so much ‘death to the child’, but death to your templates, your 
routes, your markers of appropriate progression. Death to rigidity and death to corralling may well 
give life to the child.  
 
To counter the overly conceptual abstractions of much queer theorising, we might advocate for a 
partnership between childhood studies, queer/quare studies and women of colour scholarship, 
valorising and putting to use epistemological attention to matters of lived experience. Johnson’s 
articulation of ‘quare’ offers bridging material for the coalescence of queerness, racialisation, and 
childhood, in a way that speaks to the reality of our existence in material bodies (Johnson 2001: 20). 
In ‘quare’, the child as theory and the child as flesh grow together, sustained as whole. Pérez 
highlights how whilst critical, feminist, and poststructural thinkers have ‘queered’ normative views 
on gender and sexuality, this theorising has often ‘remained grounded in the work of white male 
scholars’, and there remains a fundamental ‘lack of theoretical influences by women of colour’ 
(2017: 50). Her discussion is crucial, encouraging consideration of how a refocused childhood 
studies might emerge. She contends:  
 
centring Black feminist thought in early childhood studies challenges the separation of 
theory from the flesh, making visible the oppression and empowerment of children of 
colour, and informing multiple understandings of childhood/s and the world (2017: 55).  
 
In an endeavour to make this manifest, the project of ‘quaring childhood’ begins with Katherine 
Henninger. Henninger argues that ‘“quaring childhood” is the work of materialising queer 
experience, and quaring material experience, and that figures of southern childhood are tools 
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particularly suited for this work’ (2018: 9). Her work functions as a clarion call to bring quare 
childhoods to the fore of our theoretical imaginations, and for Henninger, ‘the repercussions for not 
doing so are as real as the bodies and experiences thus erased, from perpetuating racial injustice, to 
enabling sexual abuse, to high rates of suicide for LBGTQIA+ teenagers’ (2018: 13). To think 
quarely about childhood is to better understand ‘the spaces and temporalities of childhood’s 
queerness—[acknowledging] the matrices in which all sexualities, all childhoods, exist and 
function’ (2018: 14).  
 
Johnson, unconvinced that queer studies will change, summons quare studies as an ‘interventionist 
disciplinary project’ (2001: 20), and given his intervention was first offered almost two decades 
ago, perhaps he is right. But nonetheless, I am doubtful that to do this work solely outside of the 
wider domain of queer theory and childhood studies is enough. Whilst I am cognizant of the intent 
and necessity of carving out academic space to care for the lives of those who have been 
marginalised and brutalised both in theory and real life (Henninger 2018), in doing so, it seems that 
both queer theory and childhood studies more broadly remain exempt from any real disciplinary 
change. Our wider scholarly paradigms must do this work too, and it is wholly possible that the 
central tenets of ‘quare’ be extrapolated from the south, borrowed and put to use elsewhere. In 
doing so there is potential to denaturalise the privileging of whiteness, and to echo bell hooks’ 
(1984) phrasing, shift the positioning of lived experience, racialisation, and materiality from margin 
to centre. 
 
Pérez’s encouragement to centre Black feminist epistemology and both Johnson and Henninger’s 
evocations of ‘quare’ serve as a call to action to revoke the gaze of white supremacist 
heteropatriarchy in our childhood studies endeavours, too. Together, these interventions offer a 
vision of a tangible utopia made possible. What world appears when we decentre whiteness and 
normativity in childhood studies? Perhaps it would be one that attends to the flesh and blood child-
as-lived with sincerity; one that valorises and encourages sideways growth; one that tends to the 
child’s queerness with care; one that willingly sustains the life of the racialised child. Perhaps it 
would be one that takes seriously the agency and future of the marginal child who is all too often 
condemned to early (literal or figurative) death. Perhaps it would provide space for fragmented 




In countering queer theory’s ‘resistance to thinking about childhood as materiality’ (Dyer 2014: 
157), possibilities for new worlds and revitalised scholarship are opened up, taking us down paths 
less frequently travelled. The synergy of childhood studies and queer theory will always be 
incomplete, unless a theoretical and practical collaboration between the two bodies of knowledge 
also attends consistently and deliberately to the embodiment and materiality of the child. Whilst this 
work is underway, an embrace of women of colour feminism, quare studies, and QOC critique is 
still as necessary as ever. Without continuing to challenge the reluctance to materiality and lived 
experience that seems to reside within queer theory’s very core, and without continued critique of 
the ways in which ‘queer theory has tended to skimp on acknowledging the salience of a racialised 
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queer body—white or of colour’ (Boatwright 2016: 74), the same narratives (abstract, conceptual, 
imbued with whiteness) will emerge, and theoretical marginalisation of materiality and lived 
experience of children (some of whom are queer, all of whom are racialised) will prosper. I am not 
making the claim that QOC scholarship should halt its operations as a distinct field of inquiry. 
Rather, my argument is that a renewed relationship between childhood studies and queer theory 
must centre the theoretical accomplishments of QOC critique and women of colour feminism as a 
deliberate act of epistemological resistance to the hollowing out and bleaching of theories of 
childhood, as resistance to the removal of theory from flesh. 
 
This is not a call to use QOC critique or women of colour feminism as a plaster to remedy the 
inadequacies and soothe the wounds of a queer(ed) childhood studies, but instead an advocation for 
the continuation of coalitional thinking and scholarship that takes the many manifestations of 
materiality in childhood seriously. What queer theory offers to childhood studies is something 
destabilising. Of course, any radical invocation of queerness and queer life should serve to decentre 
heterosexuality and heteronormativity. But, as I have demonstrated throughout this paper, when 
used in conjunction with women of colour feminism and QOC critique, the disciplinary alliance of 
queer theory and childhood studies—enriched by attention to materiality, lived experience, and 
asymmetry—contains infinitely greater possibilities for dismantling conceptions of what childhood 
should be, thus allowing understandings of what childhood is and can be to emerge. My analysis 
does not provide ready answers, but it does allow us to move away from norms of how children 
ought to ‘journey’ from birth to adulthood and beyond. In tending to some of the plethoric 
entanglements of queerness and childhood, this paper has explored the ways in which childhood 
may continue to be opened out so the multiplicity of childhoods-as-lived can unfold before us. If 
Stockton (2009) suggests that queer childhood is a state of sideways growth, perhaps there is hope 
that the interdisciplinary field of childhood studies will follow suit: expanding, decentering, 
emerging as a rhizomatic endeavour in both theory and practice, one that challenges normativity in 
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